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Unconscionability in Australian Law:
Development and Policy Issues
MARK SNEDDON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1980, there has been a great expansion in the availability of
equitable and statutory relief for unconscionable contracts and uncon-
scionable conduct in Australia. Beginning in 1980, Australian state
parliaments enacted new provisions providing remedies for unjust,
unfair, or unconscionable provisions in certain classes of contracts,
usually consumer related.' Moreover, the High Court of Australia
instilled new vigor into the old equitable doctrine of unconscionable
dealing when it expanded the classes of parties entitled to benefit from
the doctrine.2 As a result of the increased availability of statutory and
equitable relief, the number of sureties seeking to use the theory of
unconscionabilty to avoid their obligations has burgeoned. Further-
more, the federal parliament recently expanded the doctrine to pro-
scribe unconscionable conduct when it relates to the supply of goods
or services in a consumer context. 3
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia; Barrister and So-
licitor; Visiting Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, 1991. B.Sc., University of Melbourne,
1983; LL.B. (Hons.), University of Melbourne, 1983; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1986. I
owe a special debt of thanks to Professor Tony Duggan of Monash University for developing
my interest, and engaging me, in the policy debate surrounding relief for unfair contracts. I
would also like to thank Professor Duggan and Mark Davison of Monash Law School for their
helpful comments on this Article.
1. The Contracts Review Act of 1980 provides for the reopening of contracts that are
"unjust in the circumstances relating to the contract at the time it was made." Contracts
Review Act, 1980, § 7 (N.S.W.). However, contracts relating to a person's profession, trade,
or business cannot be reopened. Id. § 6(2).
Part IX of the "uniform" Credit Act of 1984, adopted in New South Wales, Queensland,
Victoria, Western Australia, and the Australian Capital Territory, permits a debtor or surety
to a regulated credit contract to apply for relief on the ground that the credit contract is
unjust. See, eg., Credit Act, 1984 (N.S.W.); Credit Act, 1987, No. 52 (Queensl.); Credit Act,
1984 (Vict.); Credit Act, 1984 (W. Austl.); Credit Ordinance, 1985 (A.C.T.).
2. Commercial Bank of Australia v. Amadio, 151 C.L.R. 447 (1983) (Austl.). Australia
inherited the doctrine from England, and has used it more consistently, although not often to
benefit guarantors. This case, however, did apply the doctrine to relieve guarantors from their
liability to a lender. See id.
3. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 52A. Each of the six states has adopted an identical
provision. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Several justices of the High Court of Australia have suggested
that the prevention of unconscionable conduct is the unifying ration-
ale for equitable estoppel,4 and for the imposition of remedial con-
structive trusts.5 This approach, however, requires the doctrine to
bear a considerable burden of legal principle. 6
Not everyone believes that the concept of unconscionability can
carry this weight, at least not in its present stage of development. The
concept itself, the statutory initiatives, and, to a lesser extent, the eq-
uitable doctrine of unconscionable dealing, have been criticized as be-
ing uncertain of meaning and application. It has been suggested that
the policies supporting the statutory provisions were neither well rea-
soned nor clearly articulated, resulting in decisions that lack uniform-
ity and serve disparate and conflicting goals. 7 Conversely, there are
those who strongly favor the statutory provisions. In fact, these pro-
ponents seek removal of the consumer limitations in the statutes so
that the law can benefit small business and other contracting parties.8
This Article analyzes the evolution of the Australian methods of relief
from unconscionable dealing both in equity and under statute, and
attempts to answer some of the questions raised.
II. UNCONSCIONABILITY IN EQUITY
A. The Equitable Doctrine of Unconscionable Dealing
Australia inherited the equitable approach of rescinding uncon-
scionable transactions from England. The roots of the doctrine trace
back at least as far as 1615. 9 Until 1888, English courts used the doc-
trine to give relief to expectant heirs who had been duped into selling
4. See Commonwealth v. Verwayen, 95 A.L.R. 321 (1990) (Austl.) (opinions of Mason,
C.J., Deane, Brennan, Dawson & McHugh, JJ.); see also Waltons Stores Ltd. v. Maher, 164
C.L.R. 387 (1988) (Austl.); Foran v. Wight, 168 C.L.R. 385 (1989) (Austl.).
5. Muschinski v. Dodds, 160 C.L.R. 583, 615 (1985) (Austl.) (Deane, J.); see also Baum-
gartner v. Baumgartner, 164 C.L.R. 137, 148 (1987) (Austl.).
6. The movement towards synthesis and unification of equitable doctrines around "un-
conscionability" in the High Court of Australia merits an article in itself and will not be dis-
cussed here. This Article is confined to the equitable doctrine providing relief from
unconscionable dealing and statutory adaptations thereof. However, the later discussion in
this Article of criticisms of the unconscionability concept based on indeterminacy is relevant to
developments in the High Court.
7. A.J. Duggan, Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), Section 52A and the Law of Unjust
Contracts, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 138 (1991).
8. Geoffrey Q. Taperell, Unconscionable Conduct and Small Business: Possible Extension
of Section 52A of the Trade Practices Act 1974, 18 AUSTL. Bus. L. REV. 370 (1990).
9. See Earl of Oxford's Case, 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486 (1615).
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their reversions at substantial undervalues.' 0 After 1888, use of the
doctrine in England virtually disappeared." In Australia, however,
state courts continued to use the doctrine throughout the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.' 2 Additionally, the High Court
of Australia has applied it on three occasions in modem legal
history. ' 3
Equitable jurisdiction attaches when two elements are present:
(1) one party to a transaction is at a special disadvantage in dealing
with the other party because of illness, inexperience, ignorance, im-
paired faculties, financial hardship, age, or unfamiliarity with the lan-
guage of the transaction; and (2) the other party unconscientiously
takes advantage of this situation of special disadvantage. 14 If the two
elements are proven, the court will set aside the transaction unless the
advantaged party can show that the transaction was fair, just, and
reasonable under the circumstances.' 5 For example, the court may
find that the contract is valid if the advantaged party can show that it
was not detrimental to the disadvantaged party,' 6 or that the disad-
vantaged party received adequate independent advice. 17
As a remedy, the court may set aside the transaction in whole or
in part. If, for example, the disadvantage suffered was the result of a
10. See, e.g., Earl of Ardglass v. Muschamp, [1684] 1 Vern. 237 (Eng.); see also A.H.
Angelo & E.P. Ellinger, Unconscionable Contracts-A Comparative Study, 4 OTAGO L. REv.
300 (1979). Fry v. Lane, 40 Ch. D. 312 (1888) (Eng.), was one of the last cases to use the
doctrine.
11. Cresswell v. Potter, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 255 (Eng.), is one of the few English cases since
1888 to mention the doctrine.
12. See, e.g., Symons v. Williams, 1 V.L.R. 199 (1875) (Vict.); Sinclair v. Elderton, 21
N.S.W.L.R. 21 (1900); Carello v. Jordan, Q. St. R. 294 (1935) (Queensl.).
13. See Commercial Bank of Australia v. Amadio, 151 C.L.R. 447 (1983) (Austl.) (guar-
antee executed in situation of disadvantage known to bank); Blomley v. Ryan, 99 C.L.R. 362
(1956) (Austl.) (sale at an undervalue under pressure while vendor intoxicated); Wilton v.
Farnworth, 76 C.L.R. 646 (1948) (Austl.) (an improvident gift).
14. Blomley, 99 C.L.R. at 405-06 (Fullagar, J.), 415 (Kitto, J.); Amadio, 151 C.L.R. at
459. To satisfy the second element, it is necessary to show that the advantaged party knew of
the other party's disadvantage or at least was aware of facts from which that disadvantage
could reasonably have been inferred. Amadio, 151 C.L.R. at 462, 466-68 (Mason, J.).
15. Fry, 40 Ch. D. at 321.
16. The fact that the disadvantaged party has suffered a detriment as a result of the trans-
action could be viewed as an implicit third element of the doctrine. If no detriment occurred,
the court would not grant relief. This implicit element is analogous to the requirement that a
party complaining of undue influence must show that the transaction was manifestly disadvan-
tageous to him or her. See National Westminster Bank v. Morgan, 1985 App. Cas. 686 (appeal
taken from Eng.); European Asian Bank of Australia v. Kurland, 8 N.S.W.L.R. 192 (1985).
17. Mark Sneddon, Unfair Conduct in Taking Guarantees and the Role of Independent
Advice, 13 U. N.S.W. L.J. 302 (1990).
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misunderstanding about the maximum liability under a guarantee, the
court might set aside the guarantee to the extent it imposed liability in
excess of the maximum amount the disadvantaged party mistakenly
anticipated. 18
B. Limits on the Scope of the Equitable Doctrine
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") dis-
tinguishes between two types of unconscionability: procedural and
substantive. 19 Procedural unconscionability refers to unfairness in the
process of negotiating a contract. 20 Substantive unconscionability re-
fers to unfair terms in a contract or a contract's unjust effect.21 The
equitable doctrine concerns only the procedural aspect of uncon-
scionability. Thus, a gross imbalance in the rights and duties of the
parties or unfair terms in the contract do not in themselves justify
equitable relief. Instead, the existence of these substantive inequities
may provide evidence of procedural unconscionability, thereby lead-
ing to equitable relief.22
Practically, of course, the distinction between substantive and
procedural unconscionability may be more apparent than real. To the
extent courts infer procedural unconscionability from apparently un-
fair outcomes, they are essentially providing equitable relief for sub-
stantive unconscionability. 23  In general, however, relief from
substantive unconscionability must be obtained by statute, not in
equity.
Moreover, the equitable doctrine is concerned with unconsciona-
ble dealings or transactions. It examines conduct leading to a con-
tract or disposition of property, rather than conduct at large. Other
equitable doctrines, such as estoppel or relief against forfeiture, may
remedy unconscionable conduct in other contexts. Relief may also be
obtained under statute.
18. See Amadio, 151 C.L.R. at 480, 481 (Deane, J.).
19. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990). Professor Leff is credited with being the first to articulate
this distinction. See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
20. Leff, supra note 19, at 487.
21. Id.
22. Blomley, 99 C.L.R. at 405 (Fullagar, J.).
23. A.J. DUGGAN ET AL., REGULATED CREDIT-THE CREDIT AND SECURITY ASPECTS
537-39 (1989).
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Unconscionability Law in Australia
C. The Decision in Commercial Bank of Australia v. Amadio and
Its Impact
Commercial Bank of Australia v. Amadio24 advanced the doc-
trine of unconscionability in several respects. The defendants in
Amadio emigrated to Australia from Italy some years prior to the
transaction at issue in the case. Under pressure from their son, they
guaranteed the debts of a building company that he controlled with-
out a proper appreciation of the guarantee's terms or the company's
financial condition.25 When the company proved unable to pay its
debts, the Amadios risked losing their principal assets, which they
had put up as collateral.
The court had the option of setting aside the guarantee by finding
that the bank's conscience was bound by the son's undue influence
over the Amadios.26 Instead, the court held that the bank itself was
directly liable for its unconscionable conduct in dealing with the
sureties.
27
This holding advanced the doctrine of unconscionable dealing in
several respects. For example, the court in Amadio applied the doc-
trine to set aside a guarantee and mortgage28 rather than use it in the
more traditional context of an improvident gift29 or an undervalued
sale.30 Moreover, the case updated and expanded the existing catego-
ries of special disadvantage. The necessary relationship of special dis-
advantage consisted of several elements including the age of the
Amadios; their limited grasp of written English; their lack of business
experience in the field in which their son and his company operated;
the fact that they had been misinformed by their son that the guaran-
tee was limited in time and amount when it was unlimited in both
respects; their mistaken belief that the building company was in good
financial shape; and their reliance on their son's financial advice.
The Amadio holding is also illustrative of the apparent ease with
which the court found an unconscientious taking advantage. It ex-
24. 151 C.L.R. 447 (1983) (Austl.).
25. Id. at 448-49.
26. The case probably would have been argued this way in England, although the result
may well have been different. For a discussion of this type of case and its different treatment in
England and Australia, see Sneddon, supra note 17, at 305-16.
27. Amadio, 151 C.L.R. at 460.
28. The doctrine had been applied to this end once or twice before. See, e.g., Bank of
Victoria v. Mueller, 1925 V.L.R. 642, 649 (1914) (Vict.). However, it was the decision in
Amadio that started an avalanche of such claims.
29. Wilton, 76 C.L.R. at 646.
30. Blomley, 99 C.L.R. at 362.
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isted merely because the lender proceeded with knowledge or at least
enough information to lead to a reasonable belief that the Amadios
were disabled from making a decision in their best interests.31 Justice
Mason held that the bank was liable for unconscionable conduct be-
cause, although the bank manager was aware of a "reasonable possi-
bility" that the Amadios lacked the ability to decide what was in their
best interests due to the relationship of special disadvantage, he pro-
ceeded with the transaction without inquiring or disclosing such facts
as would have enabled the Amadios to form a proper judgment for
themselves, or counselling them to seek independent advice. 32 Ac-
cordingly, if the relationship of special disadvantage arises where a
party has a limited grasp of the language or a lack of business sophis-
tication, the "stronger" party must be vigilant to determine whether
explanation, disclosure, or independent advice is necessary.
33
Three additional factors strongly influenced the court's decision
on unconscientious taking advantage. First, Mr. Amadio mentioned
to the bank manager while executing the guarantee that he thought it
was only for six months.3 4 The manager explained that it was unlim-
ited in time.35 The court held that this exchange should have put the
manager on notice that the Amadios did not have an adequate under-
standing of the terms or effect of the guarantee and that they required
additional assistance and advice. 36 Second, because of the parlous
state of the debtor company's finances, the bank had colluded with
the son by selectively honoring and dishonoring checks in order to
give the company the false appearance of solvency. 37 Finally, the
bank knew the son was the only person advising the Amadios on the
state of the company's finances.38 Therefore, the bank manager
31. Amadio, 151 C.L.R. at 466-67 (Mason, J.), 479 (Deane, J.).
32. Id. at 467-68.
33. The implicit third element suggested by this Article, that the disadvantaged party
suffer detriment from the transaction, is usually easy to establish in the case of volunteer guar-
antors like the Amadios, where it is self-evident on the facts of the case. However, it is possible
that on appropriate facts a lender could argue that the transaction was fair, just, and reason-
able under the totality of the circumstances because the guarantor benefitted from the financial
accommodation extended to the principal debtor, such as a family company.
34. Amadio, 151 C.L.R. at 448-49.
35. Id.
36. The manager also knew that neither the Amadios nor their son had an opportunity to
read the guarantee document prior to its execution, and that the only person who might have
explained the transaction to them was the son, whose company was in grave financial difficul-
ties. Id.
37. Id. at 464-65.
38. Id. at 466.
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should have suspected that the Amadios required disclosure of the
true financial position and independent advice. 39
On its facts, the decision in Amadio is not surprising as to uncon-
scientious taking advantage. The manager tried to salvage the bank's
position on a delinquent account by helping the son mislead his credi-
tors. Despite his knowledge of the son's scheme and the fact that he
should reasonably have suspected that the sureties misunderstood the
transaction, the manager still pressed the sureties to sign the guaran-
tee to procure the additional security.
In practice, the stronger party may avoid liability once it is aware
of the other party's special disadvantage by providing such explana-
tion, disclosure, or advice as would redress the special disadvantage.
Once the stronger party has done this, it can proceed with the trans-
action in the reasonable belief that the special disadvantage has been
ameliorated. In this situation, there is no unconscionable taking
advantage.40
Amadio undoubtedly makes it easier to obtain relief under the
doctrine of unconscionable dealing. Business interests have expressed
concern about the scope of the dicta in Amadio, criticizing both a
perceived lack of certainty and the additional onus of care imposed on
stronger parties dealing with persons in special disadvantaged catego-
ries. However, subsequent decisions have demonstrated that it is
more difficult to obtain relief than some feared from the dicta in
Amadio. Like Amadio, most of the equitable doctrine cases have in-
volved fairly obvious situations of disadvantage, often coupled with
some willful blindness or significant non-disclosure on the part of the
stronger party. 4' Amadio's most obvious legacy has been the boom in
unconscionable dealing claims made by sureties seeking relief from
their contracts with lenders.42 These claims are usually coupled with
39. Id. at 468.
40. On the role of independent advice, including whether merely urging such advice is
sufficient protection, see Sneddon, supra note 17, at 319-20, 324-28.
41. See, e.g., Guthrie v. ANZ Banking Group Ltd., 1989 N.S.W. Conv. R. para. 55-463
(holding that the lender failed to disclose that a guarantee to cover a surety's husband's
purchase of a boat also covered liability of the husband under a guarantee of a company's debts
which he had executed three days earlier); National Australia Bank v. Nobile, 100 A.L.R. 227
(1988) (Austl.).
42. Claims in the more traditional categories of improvident gift and sale at an under-
value have also continued, including a novel application in the context of an unrequited love.
In D v. L, 14 Fain. 139 (1990) (Eng.), D, a lawyer, whose love for L was never reciprocated,
bought L various items of household furniture and ultimately bought her a house and had it
transferred into her name. He performed these acts even though she did not directly ask for
such gifts and made it clear she did not want to marry D or have a sexual relationship with
1992]
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claims of undue influence, which are outside the scope of this Article,
and applications for relief under the various statutory unconscionabil-
ity provisions.
III. RELIEF FROM UNCONSCIONABILITY UNDER STATUTE
Prior to 1980, legislative proscription of unconscionable con-
tracts was confined to state laws dealing with money-lending,4 3 hire-
purchases, 44 and, in one state, employment contracts. 45 The concern
with consumer credit contracts is illustrated by the majority of states'
adoption of a nearly uniform Credit Act that permits a debtor or
surety to apply for relief from a regulated credit contract or mortgage
on the ground that the contract is "unjust." A credit contract or
mortgage is considered unjust if it is "unconscionable, harsh[,] or op-
pressive," or if it charges an excessive annual percentage rate.46 Addi-
tionally, two more general provisions were enacted, the New South
Wales Contracts Review Act of 1980, and section 52A of the federal
Trade Practices Act of 1974.47
A. Contracts Review Act of 1980 (N.S. W.)
The Contracts Review Act of 1980 ("Act") was the model for
the federal act. It was partially inspired by section 2-302 of the
U.C.C.4 The Act provides an extensive list of factors to determine
whether a contract is "unjust in the circumstances relating to the con-
tract at the time it was made. ' 49 "Unjust" is defined as "harsh, un-
him. Eventually D sued to set aside the transfer of the house. The court found that L had
played on D's love and manipulated him into transferring the house to her. The special disad-
vantage was D's emotional dependence on L, and L had behaved unconscionably in using that
dependency to obtain such a large gift. The court ordered L to repay D the purchase price of
the home. See id.
43. See, e.g., Lending of Money Act, 1915, 6 Geo. V, No. 14, § 2 (ras.).
44. A "hire-purchase" is an arrangement whereby goods are leased with an option to
purchase at a nominal value at the end of the lease period. See, e.g., Hire-Purchase Act, 1959,
No. 6531, § 24 (Vict.).
45. Industrial Arbitration Act, 1940, No. 2, § 88F (N.S.W.).
46. See, e.g., Credit Act, 1984, § 145 (N.S.W.). There are equivalent provisions in part IX
of the Credit Act, 1984 (Vict.), Credit Act, 1984 (W. Austl.), Credit Act, 1987, No. 52
(Queensl.), Credit Ordinance, 1985 (A.C.T.); see also Consumer Credit Act, 1972, No. 134, pt.
VI, § 46 (S. Austl.).
47. There is a provision identical to section 52A in each of the six states. See infra note
58.
48. U.C.C. § 2-302. The influence of the U.C.C. can be seen in the report that served as
the foundation for the legislation, the Peden Report on Harsh and Unconscionable Contracts
for the New South Wales Government (1976).
49. See Contracts Review Act, 1980, § 7 (N.S.W.).
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conscionable[,] or oppressive." 50
The Act directs the court to consider
(a) whether or not there was any material inequality in bargaining
power between the parties to the contract; (b) whether or not the
provisions of the contract were the subject of negotiation;
(c) whether or not it was reasonably practicable for the party seek-
ing relief to negotiate for alteration or removal of any of the provi-
sions of the contract; (d) whether or not any of the provisions of
the contract imposed conditions which are unreasonably difficult
to comply with or not reasonably necessary for the protection of
the legitimate interests of any party; (e) whether or not a party to
the contract was not reasonably able to protect their interests be-
cause of age or physical or mental incapacity; (f) the relative eco-
nomic circumstances, educational background and literacy of the
parties; (g) the form and intelligibility of the contract; (h) whether
or not independent legal or other expert advice was obtained by the
party seeking relief; (i) the extent to which the provisions of the
contract and their legal and practical effect was explained to, and
understood by, the party seeking relief; (j) whether there was any
undue influence, unfair pressure or unfair tactics exerted on the
party seeking relief; (k) the conduct of the parties in relation to
similar dealings; and (1) the commercial or other setting, purpose
and effect of the contract.
5'
This list of factors is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, the court
may also look to other matters it considers relevant. The purpose of
the list was to provide more guidance than supplied by U.C.C. section
2-302 as to when a situation merits relief.
Unlike the equitable doctrine, the Act does not confine its atten-
tion to procedural unconscionability. Instead, the Act also considers
substantive unconscionability or injustice. 52 In West v. AGCAdvances
Ltd.,53 Justice McHugh of the New South Wales Court of Appeal
analyzed the statute and stated that "a contract may be unjust be-
cause its terms, consequences, or effects are unjust. This is substan-
tive injustice. Or a contract may be unjust because of the unfairness
of the methods used to make it. This is procedural injustice. ' 54
While most unjust contracts involve a combination of procedural and
50. Id. § 4(1).
51. Id. § 9(2).
52. The terms "unconscionable" and "unjust" are treated as interchangeable for the pur-
poses of this Act.
53. 5 N.S.W.L.R. 610 (1986).
54. Id. at 621.
1992]
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substantive injustice, Justice McHugh suggested that a contract could
be held unjust because of a gross disparity between the price of goods
or services and their value, even though no procedural injustice in the
bargaining process was apparent. 55
If a contract is found to be unjust, the court may grant relief by
refusing to enforce part or all of the contract, declaring the contract
void in whole or in part, or varying the contract. 56 Relief is effectively
limited to consumers because corporations, governmental authorities,
and persons who enter into a contract in the course of or for the pur-
poses of a trade, business, or profession, excluding farming, are barred
from seeking relief.
B. Section 52A of the Trade Practices Act
Section 52A was made part of the Trade Practices Act in 1986,
57
but is only now beginning to receive judicial consideration. It has
been incorporated into the state law in all six states.58
Section 52A(1) provides, "A corporation shall not, in trade or
commerce, in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods
or services to a person, engage in conduct that is, in all the circum-
stances, unconscionable. ' ' 59 Following the model of the Contracts
Review Act, section 52A(2) provides a non-exhaustive list of factors
for the court to consider in determining whether conduct was
unconscionable:
(a) the relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the corpo-
ration and the consumer;
(b) whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the corporation,
the consumer was required to comply with conditions that were
not reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate inter-
ests of the corporation;
55. Id. at 622.
56. Contracts Review Act, 1980, § 7(1) (N.S.W.).
57. See Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 52A.
58. See., e.g., Fair Trading Act, 1985, § I IA (Vict.); Fair Trading Act, 1987, § 43
(N.S.W.); Fair Trading Act, 1987, § 43 (S. Austl.); Fair Trading Act, 1987, § 11 (W. AustI.);
Fair Trading Act, 1989, § 39 (Queensl.); Fair Trading Act, 1990, § 15 (Tas.). For constitu-
tional reasons, the federal legislation essentially reaches both the conduct of corporations wher-
ever occurring and the conduct of any person in interstate trade. It does not reach the
intrastate conduct of a natural person. In contrast, the state law covers the conduct of all
corporations and persons. Only the federal act has been featured in the reported cases so far.
The federal act may be the only law applied so far because the state acts are more recent.
59. Trade Practices Act, 1074, § 52A(1).
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(c) whether the consumer was able to understand any documents
relating to the supply or possible supply of goods or services;
(d) whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or
any unfair tactics were used against, the consumer or a person act-
ing on behalf of the consumer by the corporation or a person act-
ing on behalf of the corporation in relation to the supply or
possible supply of the goods or services; and
(e) the amount for which, and the circumstances under which, the
consumer could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or
services from a person other than the corporation.6°
As with the Contracts Review Act, the mixture of factors in section
52A(2) suggests that relief may be given for conduct resulting in sub-
stantively unconscionable outcomes, as well as for conduct that is
procedurally unconscionable. Specifically, both paragraphs (b) and
(e) point to substantive outcomes.
In proscribing unconscionable conduct, section 52A has a
broader scope than the Contracts Review Act and the equitable doc-
trine, because it arguably covers pre-contractual activity, such as sales
promotion, as well as some post-contractual activity, such as the exer-
cise of contractual rights. It also addresses activities directed toward
enforcement, such as debt collection tactics.6 1 "Conduct" is defined
to include both making and enforcing a contract. Therefore, the crea-
tion of an "unfair" contract, or the unconscionable enforcement of a
contractual right, may be deemed to be unconscionable conduct. This
latter aspect, if developed, could give section 52A something of the
character of the good faith obligation in civil law jurisdictions.
62
Section 52A is narrower than the equitable doctrine because it is
limited to conduct in connection with the supply of goods or services
to a person. Thus, the person seeking relief usually will be an acquirer
of goods and services, whereas the equitable doctrine and the Con-
60. Id § 52A(2).
61. The Trade Practices Act provides that the institution of legal proceedings or the re-
ferral of a dispute to arbitration by a corporation in relation to the supply of goods or services
does not in itself constitute unconscionable conduct. Id § 52A(3). A demand made in antici-
pation of legal proceedings also does not constitute unconscionable conduct. See Zoneff v.
Elcom Credit Union, 94 A.L.R. 445 (1990) (Austl.). Possible unconscionable enforcement
may also exist. See Duggan, supra note 7, at 151-52.
62. See, e.g., BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] art. 242, translated in GERMAN CIVIL
CODE AS AMENDED TO JANUARY 1, 1975 (Ian S. Forrester trans., 1975) ("The debtor is
bound to effect performance according to the requirements of good faith, having regard to
common usage."). "Debtor" has a wide meaning and may be more accurately translated as
"promisor." See Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 10, at 323.
1992] 555
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tracts Review Act could apply equally to protect suppliers.63 Along
with this implicit consumer orientation are two express consumer lim-
itations. Section 52A(5) limits the goods and services referred to in
section 52A to goods or services of a kind ordinarily acquired for per-
sonal, domestic, or household use, or consumption." Section 52A(6)
provides that the supply or possible supply of goods covered by the
section does not include the supply or possible supply of goods for the
purpose of resupply or for the purpose of transforming them in trade
or commerce. 65
Violation of section 52A is not a criminal offense. Instead, an
injunction may be awarded under section 80 to restrain a breach of
the section, and an order may be made under section 87(lA) to com-
pensate any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of the
breach. The court has the discretion to decide whether to make an
order under section 87(IA). Thus, a wide variety of orders may be
made under the section. For example, the court may set aside a con-
tract, vary it, refuse to enforce it, order that money or property be
returned to the person seeking relief, or order that compensation be
paid.6
6
C. Substantive Unconscionability
As suggested above, the language of both the Contracts Review
Act and section 52A of the Trade Practices Act is broad enough to
permit courts to grant relief against substantive unconscionability, in-
cluding unfair contract terms or unjust effects of the operation of the
contract. If utilized, this potential will have significant impact. Two
areas that would be affected are standard form contracts and the role
of the conscience of the stronger party in assessing liability.
1. Standard Form Contracts
A standard form contract is one in which the consumer is
presented with a trader's standard set of terms on a take it or leave it
basis. This inability to negotiate terms may be viewed as "unfair,"
63. Injunctive relief may be sought by any person, not just an acquirer. For example, a
competitor of a supplier may seek to enjoin an unconscionable sales promotion under Trade
Practices Act, 1974, § 80 or obtain other orders under Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 87(1A).
64. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 52A(5).
65. Id. § 52A(6). The Act does not envisage services being resupplied.
66. Id. § 87(2).
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especially if there are no competitive alternatives available. 67 Lack of
negotiating opportunity alone probably does not amount to proce-
dural unconscionability in equity because it is not a recognized cate-
gory of special disadvantage. Relief from unconscionable provisions
in standard form contacts must therefore be sought under statute.
68
In Westpac Banking Corp. v. Sugden, 69 a case decided under the
Contracts Review Act, four provisions in a bank's standard form of
guarantee were held to be unjust. On its facts, this case involved very
little procedural injustice. The clauses at issue provided that if the
bank released or lost any security it held, or failed to recover any of
the moneys secured, then the guarantors would remain fully liable.
Other clauses stated that a bank officer's certificate as to the amount
owing was conclusive evidence of that amount, and that the guarantee
was fully binding upon the sureties for the full amount, notwithstand-
ing the failure of other contemplated sureties to sign later. The court
held that the clauses, which are not at all uncommon in lenders' guar-
antee forms, were not reasonably necessary for the protection of the
legitimate interests of the bank. No relief was given at that point in
the proceedings because it was not yet clear whether the unjust terms
would operate unfairly by causing loss to the guarantor plaintiffs.
Another standard form contract case decided under section 52A
of the Trade Practices Act involved a realtor's standard form sole
agency agreement. 70 Under this agreement, a vendor of land ap-
pointed a realtor as sole agent for sale of the property for a limited
period that the parties negotiated and specified in the agreement. One
of the provisions, contained in the fine print, stated that if the prop-
erty had not been sold at the expiration of the stated agency period,
and the vendor did not terminate the agency in writing, the agent was
entitled to commission on a sale made at any time thereafter, regard-
less of the agent's connection with the sale. The court held that it was
unconscionable conduct to imbed into a pro forma contract 7' a term
that was inconsistent with its purpose. This deceptive impression was
a type of procedural unconscionability. The court also found it un-
67. M.J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite
Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 359 (1976).
68. Other equitable doctrines, such as relief from penalties and forfeiture, which may
apply to specific types of provisions, are not included.
69. 1988 N.S.W. Conv. R. para. 55-377.
70. George T. Collings (Aust) Pty Ltd. v. H.F. Stevenson (Aust) Pty Ltd., [1991] A.
Trade Practices R. para. 41-104 (Vict.) (Nathan, J.).
71. A "proforma" contract is a limited term sole agency agreement.
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conscionable to impose a contingent liability on a vendor to pay a
commission for an indeterminate period after the expiration of the
exclusive term. The judgment involving this term clearly dealt with
its substantive unconscionability.
Affording relief for substantive unconscionability has attracted
criticism because it undermines the sanctity of contracts that are en-
tered into freely. However, relief for procedural unconscionability
can be reconciled with the sanctity of contract because it can be
viewed as vitiating the process of bargaining and free consent that led
to the contract. Striking down one-sided terms in the absence of pro-
cedural unconscionability involves a shift in the underlying philoso-
phy of intervention and a much greater qualification of pacta sunt
servanda 72
It is unclear whether the legislature was cognizant of the shift
involved. Indeed, it did not explain a new policy basis, being content
merely to provide a list of factors involving both process and sub-
stance for the courts to consider. The courts, however, will be aware
of the shift. Thus, it will be interesting to see whether the courts will
treat the provision as a legislative mandate to remake substantively
unfair bargains or remain tied to procedural injustice. I suspect that
because most fact situations will continue to contain some procedural
unfairness, the initial effect of the legislation will be to allow the
courts to take account of substantive unfairness and give relief in
cases that involve less procedural unfairness than is required to trig-
ger the equitable doctrine, but contain enough procedural injustice to
avoid the impression of a complete break from the precedent and pol-
icy that support the equitable doctrine. The question of how far the
courts will go in giving relief for essentially substantive unconsciona-
bility has not yet been answered.
2. Relevance of the Conscience of the Stronger Party
The equitable doctrine attempts to uncover the conscience of the
stronger party by asking if the stronger party knew of and took ad-
vantage of the plight of the weaker party. Given the combination of
procedural and substantive factors in the Contracts Review Act and
72. Duggan, supra note 7, at 167-68. Relief for substantive unconscionability could be
justified on equity grounds, such as achieving a fair distribution of wealth-or at least un-
winding certain "unfair" transfers of wealth-or on paternalistic grounds where the court
treats some contract outcomes as undesirable regardless of the preferences of the parties in-
volved. See A.J. Duggan, Some Reflections on Consumer Protection and the Law Reform
Process (Sept. 1991) (Paper delivered to the 27th Australian Legal Convention in Adelaide).
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section 52A of the Trade Practices Act, the question remains whether
it is necessary to focus on the conscience of the corporation, or merely
to discover if the conduct was objectively unfair to the consumer. The
issue has been considered under the Contracts Review Act and the
credit legislation reopening provisions.
73
In one case, the New South Wales Court of Appeal decided that
a contract can be held unjust on the basis of a weaker party's disabil-
ity even if the stronger party was unaware of it.74 The court also
found, however, that the state of knowledge of the stronger party
would be relevant to the court's exercise of discretion whether or not
to grant relief.75 It was suggested that it would be extremely rare for a
court to exercise its discretion to set aside a contract against a subjec-
tively innocent party.
76
The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria has taken a
different approach. It has held that a credit contract cannot be unjust
in the absence of unfair conduct on the part of the credit provider.77
In other words, the credit provider must have been aware, or have
had knowledge of facts from which it ought reasonably to have been
aware, of the consumer's disadvantage.78 Thus, the Victorian case
seems to represent a policy choice by the courts to use the credit stat-
ute as a weapon against knowing exploitation by the stronger party
rather than to relieve the misfortune of the weaker party in the ab-
sence of exploitation. Under this view, unconscionability under the
credit statute maintains a link to the state of the stronger party's
conscience.
However, if relief is granted for substantively unfair conduct, this
link back to the equitable doctrine may be more apparent than real.
Indeed, if intervention is based on substantive unfairness in the terms
or operation of the contract, as opposed to procedural unfairness, it
may be that the stronger party need only be aware of the unfair sub-
stance of the transaction to have the requisite guilty conscience. For
example, if a supplier sold a product knowing it to be grossly over-
priced compared to market alternatives, and on terms excluding all
73. See Collier v. Morlend Fin. Corp. (Vic) Pty Ltd., 1989 A.S.C. para. 55-716 (N.S.W.
C.A.).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Custom Credit Corp. v. Lupi (unreported decision) (Dec. 12, 1990) (Vict.).
78. Id.
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liability to the consumer,79 does that constitute unconscionable con-
duct on the basis of sections 52A(2)(b) and (e)? At common law,
caveat emptor would protect the supplier by putting the onus on the
buyer to look after his or her own interests. Section 52A, however,
would leave it to a court to find the transaction substantively uncon-
scionable and the supplier guilty of unconscionable conduct because it
knew the transaction was substantively unconscionable. Such a result
amounts to a policy decision that selling at this price, on these terms,
in this market, is unacceptable.
Common law courts, however, have been reluctant to condemn
this example of a purely economic exploitation. Instead, these courts
have confined themselves to redressing the knowing exploitation of
particular classes of disadvantaged people who could not take care of
themselves. Thus, courts have shown resistance in judging the fair-
ness of a merchant's terms of trade in the abstract without the aid of
clear legislative guidelines. Rather, courts might choose to leave
alone those issues traditionally left to the market to regulate.
If courts balk at the prospect of imposing liability on the supplier
for purely substantive unfairness, how much knowledge by the sup-
plier of procedural unfairness or disadvantage of the consumer must
be added before relief is granted? For example, if the supplier had
actual knowledge that the consumer was not aware of the market al-
ternatives,80 does this knowledge of the consumer's ignorance, cou-
pled with the substantive unfairness of the transaction, make the
supplier guilty of unconscionable conduct? The supplier knows, and
takes advantage, of the consumer's disadvantage, and to that extent
the supplier has a guilty conscience. The decision whether relief will
be granted depends on whether the policy chosen puts the responsibil-
ity on the supplier or the consumer.
Equity would not afford relief because a lack of information that
could be readily obtained 1 is not a special disadvantage.8 2 Equity
79. Certain types of liability cannot be excluded. Sections 68 through 72 of the Trade
Practices Act prevent the exclusion of certain statutory implied warranties in consumer sales
and supply contracts. Trade Practices Act, 1974, §§ 68-72.
80. For example, if the salesman asked the time honored question of "How many other
dealers have you visited?"
81. I am assuming that information on market alternatives was readily available if the
consumer made inquiries.
82. The facts could be varied again to increase the personal nature of the consumer's
disadvantage. Assume the consumer is old, relatively immobile, and unable to check the mar-
ket alternatives for this product without great difficulty, and this is obvious to the supplier.
Again, there is a "guilty conscience" and equity would probably afford relief in such a case
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does not, however, limit the scope of the statute. In the common case
where the supplier knows, or reasonably suspects, consumer igno-
rance of alternatives, the requirement of a "guilty conscience" would
seem to be satisfied. A guilty conscience will often be present in the
sense that the supplier knows of the consumer's disadvantage. The
true policy issue is whether trading on unfair terms in reliance on
consumer ignorance constitutes unconscionable conduct. Unfortu-
nately, very little legislative guidance exists to define what constitutes
substantively unconscionable conduct. Inevitably, such a gap has cre-
ated uncertainty in the application of statutory unconscionability pro-
visions. This uncertainty is one of the major criticisms of the
unconscionability statutes.
IV. CRITICISMS OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
One criticism of U.C.C. section 2-302 is that it provides no gui-
dance as to the meaning of "unconscionable. 8 3 In terms of proce-
dural unconscionability, section 2-302 does not reveal what conduct
in the bargaining process invites judicial scrutiny. Similarly, for sub-
stantive unconscionability, there is no guidance as to how to identify
when a provision is "bad.""
With regard to section 52A of the Trade Practices Act, Duggan
has criticized the absence of a coherent policy basis:
The basic problem is that the legislation lacks a coherent philoso-
phy. It is nowhere stated, and has probably never been deter-
mined, whether the concern is with the behavior of the stronger
party, or the plight of the weaker. If it is the former, the legislation
could easily be reconciled with welfare ("freedom of contract")
principles. If it is the latter, the legislation would serve an equity
(distributive) function. If it is a mix of the two, it needs to be
asked, first, what sort of mix is intended, and second[ ], whether it
is possible simultaneously to pursue competing policy goals.85
This Article first considers the criticism of uncertainty in general
terms. Then, it considers the equitable doctrine of unconscionability
and the statutory provisions in light of the criticisms of uncertainty,
as well as the lack of a principled policy basis.
because there is a special disadvantage in that the information is not readily available to this
consumer.
83. See U.C.C. § 2-302; see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 310 (1982).
84. See Leff, supra note 19.
85. Duggan, supra note 7, at 167.
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A. Uncertainty of Meaning and Application
A power to give relief against unconscionable contracts or con-
duct necessarily involves some uncertainty of application. At the
most general level, unconscionable conduct is conduct that offends
the conscience of society, as determined by the courts.86 That inter-
pretation will be highly fact sensitive, responding to numerous factors
in a multitude of situations. Presumably, that conscience may change
over time. Expressed as a standard at this high level of abstraction,
unconscionable conduct is a concept better described than defined. 7
This apparent indeterminacy makes some lawyers, especially com-
mercial lawyers, despair. If pacta sunt servanda is undermined by a
general doctrine of relief based on conscience, lawyers believe that
uncertainty and increased litigation will be the likely result.88 Ac-
cordingly, lawyers and business people would prefer rules that would
minimize the discretion of the decision maker and provide clear gui-
dance for future conduct.
Equity according to conscience requires a flexible standard and
not a set of rules that leave no room for discretion. Because equity
insists on adhering to a standard of fair dealing, a lesser degree of
certainty inevitably will be the result. Therefore, a difficulty arises
because the value of certainty and predictability in the law conflicts
with the value of ensuring equity according to conscience.
Critical legal studies scholars have noted that because the law
holds these two values in tension, we can expect continuing debate,
oscillation, and unsettled conclusions.8 9 Thus, law makers must de-
cide whether to use rules that are certain but inflexible, or flexible
standards that bring uncertainty. 90
A discretionless rule for enforcing contracts would uphold all
contracts where both parties receive something. This outcome would
be the same regardless of how the bargain was made or the propor-
86. As one wit has put it, "Unconscionable conduct is always conduct that offends some-
one else's conscience."
87. Commonwealth v. Verwayen, 95 A.L.R. 321, 322 (1990) (Austl.) (Deane, J.); see also
National Westminster Bank v. Morgan, 1 All E.R. 821, 831 (1985) (Eng.) (Lord Scarman)
("Definition is a poor instrument when used to determine whether a transaction is or is not
unconscionable: this is a question which depends on the particular facts of the case.").
88. Donovan W.M. Waters, Equitable Doctrines:- Canadian Experiences, in EQurrY,
TRUSTEES AND FIDUCIARIES 432 (Timothy G. Youdan ed., 1989).
89. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 14-15 (1987); see also
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976).
90. KELMAN, supra note 89, at 14-15.
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tionality of the parties' rights and obligations. An unpredictable stan-
dard for contract enforcement would hold that contracts that, in the
opinion of the courts, are unfair in the method of their making or in
their terms should not be enforced. 91 Neither extreme seems palat-
able. Some discretion to give relief against injustice and uncertainty
must be admitted. At the same time, some guidance for judges and
citizens also must be provided. The question, however, is where the
balance should be struck.
One argument suggests that even without an explicit doctrine of
unconscionability, English courts already give relief against uncon-
scionable conduct in the bargaining process, unfair contract terms,
and unfair use of contract terms through a variety of devices and doc-
trines.92 In the application of these rules or techniques, the concern
for fairness or reasonableness has seldom been explicit. In some cases,
such a concern may have been the unstated rationale for the original
rule, but failure to make it explicit later led to rigid application of the
rule in circumstances where there was no unfairness. The failure to
recognize a broad principle of unconscionability may lead to distor-
tion of the rules being made to serve as proxies for an unconscionabil-
ity rule. Moreover, the hiding of the true rationale means that later
courts may apply the proxy rule in such a way as to thwart the origi-
nal policy aims of the unconscionability doctrine. 93 Concealing the
true rationale of unconscionability in these decisions will also produce
uncertainty.
94
As long as courts seek flexibility to do justice in individual cases,
some degree of uncertainty remains inevitable. Therefore, it is appro-
priate to consider whether the equitable and statutory doctrines of
unconscionability strike the right balance between fairness and
certainty.
91. Id. at 19-20.
92. Stephen M. Waddams, Unconscionability in Contracts, 39 MOD. L.R. 369 (1976).
English courts, out of a concern for fairness, have resisted the incorporation of one-sided docu-
ments into contracts, construed terms against the party inserting them, read down exemption
clauses (for example, by finding that there was insufficient notice of their terms to exclude
certain types of liability), stretched the absence of true consent defenses, such as undue influ-
ence, given relief against penalties and forfeitures, and sometimes withheld discretionary reme-
dies. Id.
93. Id. at 379.
94. Anyone who has had to advise on the efficacy of an exclusion clause in a standard
terms form that is incorporated by reference can attest to this phenomenon. Indeed, Professor
Leff recognized the validity of this argument but disputed that unguided statutory power to
give relief was the answer. See Leff, supra note 19, at 527.
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B. The Equitable Doctrine of Unconscionable Dealing
Like many other equitable doctrines, unconscionable dealing be-
gan as a general rule of conscience and has been refined into a set of
principles that delimit its scope of operation, and permit prediction of
its application. The doctrine only operates where there is a relation-
ship of special disadvantage and the stronger party unconscientiously
takes advantage of that situation.95 The policy rationale is clear. The
doctrine is designed to prevent exploitation by the stronger party in
the contract formation process of a weakness or disability suffered by
the other party, and not simply to remedy poor substantive outcomes
for the weaker party. If one party receives a bad deal, the equitable
doctrine will not assist that party unless the outcome was caused by a
special disadvantage of the types recognized: the stronger party knew
of and took advantage of that disadvantage by proceeding with the
transaction without taking some steps to redress the disadvantage,
and the advantage taken was unconscientious. 96 In my opinion, this
doctrine is limited enough in scope and application to ensure reason-
able certainty. The categories of special disadvantage, though not
closed, are sufficiently clear to put the stronger party on notice that
additional disclosure, explanation, or counsel may be required when
dealing with parties in those categories. Although unconscionable
dealings cannot be described as indeterminate, room exists for discre-
tion and value judgment, 97 and the doctrine is flexible enough to ex-
pand into new areas.
Some commentators suggest that unanswered questions about
the doctrine's application in different types of cases reveal confusion
about underlying values. 98 In my view, many of those questions can
today be answered for the equitable doctrine. 99 As to the rest, many
95. An implicit third condition requires that the weaker party suffer some detriment as a
result; otherwise, there would be no exploitation, and usually no lawsuit.
96. Verwayen, 95 A.L.R. at 321.
97. One area of discretion is in the description of a special disadvantage. Forexample, it
is unlikely that both parties will have the same amount of information about a product or
service, and most such information imbalances will not amount to a special disadvantage.
Likewise, not all advantage taking is unconscientious. Instead, this requires a judicial value
judgment as to what is a legitimate bargaining advantage and what is exploitation of a
weakness.
98. Duggan, supra note 7, at 167.
99. Some of the questions posed by Finn ask what the policy of the law should be as
much as what it is, but my present concern is with the criticism that we cannot be sure in some
respects what the policy of the doctrine of unconscionable dealing is. I believe there is more
clarity in the current position than Duggan implies, and, based on the discussion in this Arti-
cle, I proffer answers to some of Finn's questions. For example:
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will be answered as necessary in time through the normal process of
developing and refining legal principles in the common law. There
are few, if any, legal doctrines with unanswered questions about their
scope and application and the detail of their underlying rationale.
Further, some aspects of equitable doctrines may never be finally and
exhaustively described as a set of certain rules, and it is undesirable
that they should. An equitable doctrine based on conscience cannot
and should not be reduced to a set of rigid rules, for to do so is to
convert equity into law. There must be principles to guide citizens'
conduct and judges' discretion, but because the nature of equitable
jurisdiction based on conscience is to be self-renewing and adaptable,
it is incapable of being corralled into the pens of precedent.
C. Statutory Unconscionability Provisions
The criticisms of uncertainty and lack of coherent philosophy ap-
ply especially to statutory provisions. For the most part, the criti-
cisms are justified because the lawmakers and the drafters did not
think through the policy values. Rather, they gave the courts little or
no textual guidance regarding the underlying rationale. Thus far, the
courts have had limited opportunity to expound on some of these pro-
visions and develop the principles that the legislation omitted. As a
result, the policy basis and application of the statutes remain unclear.
When section 52A of the Trade Practices Act was first proposed,
it was strongly attacked by various business groups for its uncertainty
and its consequent potential to increase litigation and costs of busi-
Q. Should the law promote relational (neighborhood) responsibilities in the contracting pro-
cess or should it merely curb the excesses of self-interested action?
A. The doctrine of unconscionable dealing seeks only to do the latter by relieving against
oppression.
Q. Should the courts, by insisting upon an information exchange (or on conduct capable of
securing an equivalent effect[, such as] the recommendation of independent advice), seek to
procure some degree of equality of understanding in the decision to contract... or should they
merely concern themselves with compelling that level of assistance without which one party is
left open to grave exploitation?
A. The doctrine of unconscionable dealing only does the latter. In fact, merely counselling
the weaker party to take independent advice and giving a real opportunity for that to occur can
be enough, depending on the facts, to give the stronger party a clean conscience about
proceeding.
Q. Should the uninitiated or untutored be entitled to an explanation of the nature and effects
of the dealing offered?
A. If their ignorance is reasonably apparent to the stronger party, the stronger party should
provide the explanation, or counsel them to seek it from an independent adviser.
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ness.oo In an attempt to ameliorate the uncertainty, the drafters of
section 52A, like the drafters of the Contracts Review Act, departed
from the model of U.C.C. section 2-302 by providing a non-exhaus-
tive checklist of factors to which the court may look when deciding
whether the contract or conduct is unconscionable. It was thought
that the prescription of such criteria would reduce the uncertainty
inherent in applying general and abstract principles, such as injustice
or unconscionability to particular circumstances.' 0' Certainly the ad-
dition of such a checklist provides a focus for the analysis and discus-
sion of particular contracts or conduct, and the factors paint a word-
picture of some archetypical dramas the legislature had in mind. 0 2
Although these images can warn business people and their advisors
when they are in dangerous areas, an archetype does not enable pre-
diction of the outcome of cases that bear only partial resemblance to
the archetype. The argument remains that, on major policy ques-
tions, section 52A is still indeterminate notwithstanding the statutory
checklist. 103
I agree that there is no clear legislative guidance to the policy
rationale behind section 52A. It is clear that the legislature wanted to
endorse and perhaps extend the equitable doctrine's attack on proce-
dural unconscionability. In addition, it seems likely that the legisla-
ture wanted to extend the' net to some pre-contractual and post-
contractual conduct and perhaps to introduce a limited form of good
faith obligation in so doing. Although the legislature may have
sought to strike at some forms of substantive unconscionability, it of-
fered no clues to finding a principled balance between such a power
and the general principle of freedom of contract. 104
In substance, section 52A is a grant of power by the legislature to
the courts to develop a doctrine of unconscionable conduct in relation
100. David Ford, Unconscionable Conduct-A Matter for the Courts or the Legislatures?,
13 AusTL. Bus. L. REV. 307 (1985).
101. John Goldring, Certainty in Contracts, Unconscionability and the Trade Practices Act:
The Effect of Section 52A, II SYDNEY L. REv. 514, 527 (1988).
102. Some examples may be a consumer dealing with a supplier who is in a superior bar-
gaining position; a consumer unable to understand documents relating to the supply contract;
documents containing onerous conditions for the consumer that are not reasonably necessary
for the protection of the supplier; undue influence or unfair tactics used against the consumer;
and the consumer signing up for goods or services on terms that are most unfavorable when
compared with those offered by competing suppliers.
103. Duggan, supra note 7, at 167.
104. This is shown by the above discussion of standard form contracts and the relevance of
the advantaged party's conscience if relief can be given for substantive unconscionability.
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to the supply of goods and services in a consumer context. It is ap-
propriate to criticize the legislature for passing the responsibility of
significant policy making to the courts, but such conduct is not un-
precedented. The response of the courts and the profession to this
development is what matters now. Is the statute to be treated merely
as window dressing for the equitable doctrine, or does it launch us
into the brave new world of substantive unconscionability and good
faith? Is there instead some acceptable middle course?
The easy response is to ignore or neutralize provisions like sec-
tion 52A so that they do nothing more than equity. Such a course fits
the prevailing common law philosophy of freedom of contract and
involves no change. Reading section 52A this way may bring the cor-
rect result, but the reasoning is wrong. Having recognized that the
legislature has in effect transferred its policy making function on these
issues to the courts, lawyers need to assist the courts in determining
what principles should guide the use of these provisions. That gui-
dance requires a policy dialogue, not inertia. Although I do not yet
have a final view to recommend on the appropriate policy and appli-
cation for section 52A, I offer the following thoughts.
In Australia's market economy, although pacta sunt servanda
will continue to be the guiding principle of the law of contracts, its
rigid application can produce real injustice, particularly to the less
powerful in society. This is evidenced by the many devices common
law courts have used to mute the rigor of the principle while paying
lip service to it over many years, 10 5 and the explosion in consumer
protection legislation in particular fields in the last twenty years. Late
twentieth century Australia, with its social security and consumer
protection systems, is many steps removed in its zeal for sanctity of
contract from eighteenth and nineteenth century England. It may be
that a general power to relieve against unconscionable conduct is sim-
ply the next step away from that era. A power to give relief for sub-
stantive unconscionability could present great opportunities for good.
That said, it is necessary to find principles to guide the power so the
result is not a morass of uncertainty and endless litigation where the
rule of law has become the discretion of the judges. Such a result is
not the inevitable consequence of these provisions. 10 6 The best way to
105. See Waddams, supra note 92.
106. Germany and the United States have lived with general unconscionability provisions
for many years. See Angelo & Ellinger, supra note 10, at 318; see also U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990).
Even Professor Leff predicted that the uncertainty in section 2-302 would not be the end of the
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avoid it is for Australian lawyers to direct their energies to finding the
principles that will balance fairness with certainty and make provi-
sions like section 52A work.
world and that the courts would bring order where the legislature had provided none. See
Leff, supra note 19, at 558.
